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Leibniz's Petite Fable and His Justification for the Thesis That This Is the Best of All Possible Worlds

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While the *Theodicy* is a notoriously long and meandering work, it consists for the most part of Leibniz presenting arguments for his own views, critical engagement with long passages from the writings of Pierre Bayle, and assorted discussions of the views of figures from the history of philosophy and theology. It is, therefore, something of a surprise to find Leibniz ending the work with a mythical narrative, initially in dialogue form, which is often referred to as "The Petite Fable". In this paper, I want to offer an, admittedly speculative, account of why Leibniz chose to include the Fable.

1. The Content of the Petite Fable

The Petite Fable begins with a summary of part of Lorenzo Valla's *Dialogue on Free Will*, which was written as a response to Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*. Valla's original discussion ends in an impasse, but Leibniz continues the narrative and introduces a resolution of the difficulties that have given rise to it.

The *Dialogue* is a conversation between the author and a character named Antonio Glarea. Leibniz takes things up where Antonio asks Lorenzo for his opinion on Boethius' reconciliation of divine foreknowledge with human freedom. Antonio expresses his worry as follows: "If God foresaw the treason of Judas, it was necessary that he would betray, it was impossible for him not to betray. There is no obligation to do the impossible. He therefore did not sin, he did not deserve to be punished. That destroys justice and religion, and the fear of God" (Th 3 §407).[1]

Lorenzo's response is that Antonio has failed to "distinguish between the necessary and the certain" (ibid.). Although it is "infallibly sure" that Judas will sin, this does not mean it is necessary. There may be a puzzle about how it is possible, but divine foreknowledge does not on its own have any bearing on the modal status of what is foreknown.

At this point, Lorenzo introduces the semi-mythical character of Sextus Tarquinius, the son of the last king of Rome. According to legend, Sextus raped his cousin's wife Lucretia. This led to Lucretia's suicide and acts of revenge, including Sextus' murder and the revolt that precipitated the founding of the Roman Republic. Lorenzo describes a situation in which Sextus visits the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi and is told his fate. Sextus complains, but Apollo re-

[1] References to G.W. Leibniz: *Les Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal*, Amsterdam 1710 are given by part and section, except for references to the Preface where the pagination in GP is given.

sponds "I know the future, but I do not bring it about. Go complain to Jupiter and the Parcae" (Th 3 §409).

Antonio ultimately accepts Lorenzo's suggestion that it would be unreasonable of Sextus to continue to remonstrate against Apollo. However, the dialogue does not end there. Lorenzo claims that Apollo will supplement his account of why Sextus' fate is just by telling him that his sinful acts are due to the wicked soul which Jupiter gave him (see Th 3 §410/H 368). Antonio then suggests that Apollo has shifted the blame from Sextus to Jupiter. For Sextus would surely object that Jupiter "could have made [him] altogether different" (Pt 3 §411).

Perhaps surprisingly, Lorenzo agrees. However, he then reminds Antonio that he had only agreed to resolve the tension between foreknowledge and freedom; and he suggests that Antonio follow St Paul and acknowledge that, when it comes to the fact that Sextus was created such that he would freely will his fate, "We do not know the reasons which [God] may have for this; but it is enough *that he is very good and very wise, to make us judge that they are good*" (Th 3 §412).[2]

At this point Leibniz begins to speak with his own voice again. Although he praises Valla, he clearly has sympathy for Antonio and suggests that Valla "cuts the knot and seems to condemn providence under the name of Jupiter, making him almost the author of sin" (Th 3 §413). Leibniz then extends the dialogue in with his account of how to untie the knot. Sextus leaves Apollo at Delphi and travels to Dodona, the site of Jupiter's oracle where he asks Jupiter either to change his character and fate or take responsibility for his "fault" (ibid.). Jupiter responds by telling Sextus that if he renounces his claim to the Roman crown all will be well; but Sextus cannot and his fate is as Apollo had foreknown.

Leibniz then introduces a new character, "Theodorus, the High Priest" (Th 3 §413), who has witnessed the discussion. Theodorus addresses Jupiter directly: "your faithful worshippers are astonished; they would like to admire your goodness as well as at your greatness; but it rested with you to give him a different will" (ibid.). In response Jupiter tells Theodorus "Go to my daughter Pallas, she will teach you what I had to do" (ibid.).

Theodorus heads to Pallas' temple in Athens where he falls asleep and dreams that he is in "an unknown country" where there is "a palace of inconceivable splendour and immense size" (Th 3 §414). Pallas appears and touches Theodorus' face with an olive branch that she is carrying so that he is able to "confront the divine radiancy [of Pallas] … and of everything that she had to show him" (ibid.). Pallas then announces to Theodorus that Jupiter loves him and that she has been asked to instruct him. She tells him that what he sees is "the palace of destinies" which contains apartments that are "representations not only of that which happens but also of all that is possible"; and that before the

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[2] See Romans 11:33.

world came into existence Jupiter "classified the possibilities into worlds, and chose the best of all" (ibid.). Theodorus also learns that there is an infinite number of these worlds which vary in such a way that their structure will provide the answer to any question about what would be the case if something differed from what is found in the actual world.

Pallas tells Theodorus that she will show him other worlds which have their own "Sextuses", each of whom have all the features that Theodorus knows to hold of the true of the actual Sextus but who differ "imperceptibly" and with respect to what "shall yet happen to him" (Th 3 §414). She then leads him into one of the apartments in the palace, which "was now no longer an apartment … [but] a world", where he sees "[Sextus'] whole life as at a glance, and as in a theatre performance" (Th 3 §415), but where the Sextus in question does as Jupiter had suggested at Dodona and lives out a happy life. The pair then go on a journey from apartment to apartment in which they find different Sextuses who meet different fates. We are then told that "The apartments rose in a pyramid, became even more beautiful as one climbed towards the apex, and represented more beautiful worlds", but that the pyramid had "no base" and "went on increasing to infinity" (Th 3 §416). Pallas explains the structure of the pyramid as follows: "[A]mong an infinity of possible worlds there is the best of all, otherwise God would not have determined to create any of them; but there is not any one which does not also have less perfect worlds below it: that is why the pyramid goes on descending to infinity" (ibid.).

Pallas and Theodorus enter the apartment at the apex, which is said to be "the most beautiful of all" (ibid.), where Theodorus "found himself rapt in ecstasy" such that he has to be revived by Pallas with "a drop of a divine liquor placed on his tongue" and Pallas tells him "We are in the actual true world … and you are there at the source of happiness [which] Jupiter prepares for you, if you continue to serve him faithfully" (ibid.).

Next Pallas draws attention to the crimes and destiny of Sextus, whilst also noting that had Jupiter created a different Sextus "it would no longer be this world" (ibid.). And she finishes by telling Theodorus a number of things of philosophical significance about this world, "which surpasses all the others in perfection" (ibid), including: 1) Jupiter "could not have failed to choose this world" because to do this "he would have given up his wisdom"; 2) Jupiter "did not make Sextus wicked" but "only granted him the existence which his wisdom could not refuse"; and 3) Sextus' existence "serves great things" such as the freeing of Rome. In short, the mythical narrative conveys the idea that the apparent problem of reconciling God's goodness with evil is resolvable because the actual world is the best of all those which were available to God as possible objects of creation.

We then come to the very last section of the Theodicy, which contains the end of fable: "At this moment Theodorus awakens, he gives thanks to the Goddess, he owns the justice of Jupiter, and pervaded by what he has seen and heard, he carries on the office of High Priest, with all the zeal of a true servant

of his God, and with all the joy of which a mortal is capable" (Th 3 §417). Leibniz then draws the *Theodicy* as a whole to a close[3] by suggesting that his continuation of the dialogue "can clear up the difficulty which Valla did not want to touch" if we take Apollo to represent "God's knowledge of vision (which concerns the existing beings)" and Pallas to represent God's "knowledge of simple intelligence (which considers all the possible beings)" (ibid.).

2. The Significance of the Petite Fable

In the space that remains I want to make some suggestions regarding the significance of the Leibniz's inclusion of the Petite Fable in the *Theodicy*. As we have seen, the Fable is supposed to allow us to see how to resolve difficulties arising for the justice of God out of Valla's *Dialogue*. It accomplishes this by presenting in narrative form a conception of God and an account of creation according which the actual world is the best of infinitely many possible worlds - which I shall refer to as "the best of all possible worlds thesis" from here on. Given this, we find ourselves with a *prima facie* puzzle. For these are views that Leibniz appears to have established much earlier in the work.

If we turn back to Th 1 §7-§8 of the *Theodicy* we find an argument for the existence of a God with the same nature as the God of the Fable and for the best of all possible worlds thesis. Th 1 §7 establishes that there is a necessarily existing substance which is "the reason for the existence of the world", where the world is "the whole collection of contingent things" (ibid.). Here the contingency claim is based on the further claim that "time, space and matter, united and uniform in themselves and indifferent to everything, could have received entirely other motions and shapes, and in another order" (ibid). Next Leibniz argues that, given the nature of time, space, and matter, there was an infinite number of other possible worlds, and he infers from this that the actual world could only have emerged through the choice of an infinitely capable being. Furthermore, given that a choice was involved, Leibniz also claims that the being must have been wise and aiming at the good. The proof that this is the best of all possible worlds in §8 is then very simple.

> "Now this supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind of good, even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way of a greater good; and there would be something to correct in the actions of God if it were possible to do better" (Th 1 §8).

Here the puzzle manifests itself. What could the Petite Fable have added, given that Leibniz had already proved the central theses that it depicts?

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[3] I refer here to the main body of the book. Leibniz's text also includes a number of appendices.

As Lloyd Strickland has pointed out, elsewhere Leibniz claims that for many people religious piety requires "something … which affects their passions and which ravishes their souls, as does music and poetry" (Gr 88–89).[4] So one might wonder whether the Fable is supposed to help with this. But when introducing the Fable in Th 3 §405, Leibniz indicates that he does not include it "to enliven the matter" (Th 3 § 405).

Leibniz does make other remarks that speak to the issue. When the Fable is first mentioned, in the Preface, we learn that it is designed for those who like "difficult but important truths set forth in an easy and familiar way" (GP VI, 48). And immediately before the Fable itself, Leibniz notes that he includes it to "explain [him]self … in the clearest and the most straightforward [*populaire*] way possible" (Th 3 §405). But these remarks still leave his motivation rather obscure. He suggests clarity as a goal; but it is hard to see that there could be a clearer way to support the theses depicted in the Fable than the arguments of Th 1 §7-§8. Nor is it obvious why the reader would have found the theses' exposition "familiar" or "straightforward" when presented using this literary device. Indeed, the introduction of mythical figures to serve as stand-ins for God's attributes might be thought to confuse matters.

However, further reflection on the proof reveals that it relies on a number of assumptions that seem neither to be self-evident nor based on empirical evidence. In particular, §7 includes an appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason in order to rule out the possibility that the existence of the actual world is a matter of brute fact. And the claim that the cause of the world is a God who possesses the traditional attributes is secured only by the additional assumption that the existence of one of those possibilities required a choice among infinite alternatives, where choice is construed as being governed by a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which requires that the sufficient reason be both an efficient and final cause.

But it is not merely that these are unproven assumptions, they are assumptions that have been contested throughout the history of philosophical thought and were explicitly contested by Leibniz's contemporaries. Indeed, we find Leibniz himself explicitly criticizing those who operate within the voluntarist tradition, such as Descartes and Hobbes, and conceived of choice in a way that requires that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is violated;[5] and against Spinoza, who claimed that the existence of the world was not a result of choice at all.[6]

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[4] See Lloyd Strickland: "Leibniz on Eternal Punishment", in: *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 17 (2) (2009), pp. 307-331, here p. 330.

[5] For Leibniz's critique of Descartes, see Th 1 §50; and for his critique of Hobbes, see "Reflections on Hobbes", §5; GP VI, 391-92.

[6] For Leibniz' critique of Spinoza, see "On the Ethics of Benedict de Spinoza" from 1678(?); A VI, 4, 1775-76.

Furthermore, in Th 1 §9 Leibniz explicitly acknowledges another problem that the argument faces. Even for those who find the proof somewhat persuasive, it is all too easy to imagine worlds which seem better than the actual one. Leibniz's basic response is simple "but I deny that then it would have been better" (ibid). However, he goes a little further. In doing so, he draws attention to the fact that, in creating, God paid attention to the entire content of the actual world. This is then combined with an application of another unargued assumption, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles,[7] to lead to the conclusion that any other world would have been numerically distinct from the actual world. For, given that this world was the one that the supremely wise and good God chose, it follows that any imagined alternative would in fact have been worse. In short, even if there is clarity in Leibniz's case for the best of all possible worlds thesis, the arguments as they stand would be likely to seem question begging to some, given that they depend upon principles that Leibniz does not establish.

In light of this, we can see how there might be room for another interpretation of Leibniz's positive appraisal of the Fable, namely as showing why Leibniz thought it was legitimate to accept the theses proved in Th 1 §7-§8 without relying on the questionable assumptions. I want to offer such an interpretation in the space that remains. But first a caveat. The account that I will offer is speculative, and the case I will make for it is very provisional.[8]

Central to this interpretation will be the identity of the characters that appear in the narrative portion. As we have already seen, Leibniz explicitly presents the characters from Greco-Roman myth, Apollo, Jupiter, and Pallas as personifications of God's attributes; and he identifies Theodorus as Jupiter's high priest – i.e., the high priest of divine wisdom. However, my interpretation will depend on extending this further. I want to suggest that we should take Theodorus to represent Leibniz himself, and, given this assumption, that both the dream and the fable can be taken to have an autobiographical significance.[9]

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[7] Strictly speaking it is an appeal the indiscernibility of identicals.

[8] The account that I will offer here is substantially different to that developed by Tae-Yeoun Keum (see Tae-Yeoun Keum: *Plato and the Mythic Tradition in Platonic Thought*, Cambridge 2020). Keum takes the Petite Fable to be in service of a conception of the *Theodicy* according to which it "essentially consists in a justification for the continuity of reason and faith, or in the position that there exists no boundary separating the realm of philosophy from that of theology" (2020, p. 106). She elaborates by suggesting that "To assign to reason this way the overarching powers of knowledge traditionally attributed to divine revelation was to commit to what Christia Mercer describes as a 'radical rationalism': a conception of reason's boundaries that denies any limitations to what humans are capable of knowing through rationality alone" (ibid).

[9] It is worth noting that Leibniz also describes a dream that is both autobiographical and involves a response to the problem of evil in another work, namely a piece that is known as "Leibniz's Philosophical Dream". For a translation and interpretaion of the

One thing that counts in favour of this is that Leibniz's use of dialogue form generally includes characters who appear to speak as his mouthpiece.[10] But this is augmented in the case of the Fable by the fact that the character shares their name with Theodorus of Cyrene. Theodorus is known to us only through Plato's *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman*. He is depicted by Plato as the mathematician who discovered what is now called "the spiral of Theodorus", which shows that the square roots of non-square integers are irrational. My identification is thus based in part on the fact Theodorus and Leibniz would have been readily identified by the readers of the *Theodicy* as mathematicians. However, the nature of Theodorus of Cyrene's discovery is salient in another way that bolsters this. Here I have in mind the fact that central to the claims of the *Theodicy* is Leibniz's insistence that human activity is free partly in virtue of being contingent. As is well known, a central component of Leibniz's mature account of contingent truths is that they cannot be demonstrated in a finite number of steps. And in the essay "On Freedom …", from 1689(?), Leibniz illustrates this conception of contingent truths by drawing an analogy with the comparison of a rational and irrational number, such as the measure of the sides of a square and its diagonal.[11]

With the claim that Theodorus represents Leibniz in place, it is important to remember that the Fable is an account of a dream which contains a personal revelation. Whilst asleep, Theodorus meets with God in the form of divine wisdom, who then provides him with an interpretation of what he is experiencing. This includes the fact that the apartment in which he has his ecstatic experience represents not only the best possible world, but also the actual world. Furthermore, given that Theodorus is told that the palace he experiences contains an infinite number of apartments, it follows that the articulation of the content of the experiences in the dream outstrip the discursive cognitive capacities of a finite being such as he is. Only a being with the infinite capacities of God would be in a position to do this and to have access to the evidence needed to rationally ground a commitment to the propositions representing it. Thus, on the reading that I propose, the Fable depicts Theodorus gaining experiential insight into the fact that the best of all possible worlds thesis, as God has characterised it and as it presented in Th 1 §7-§8, cannot be proved by a finite being. Indeed, he is literally rendered unconscious by his encounter with what is going on and is only revived by having "a drop of a divine liquor placed on his tongue" (Th 3 §416/H 372). But it is also crucial to notice that Theodorus is not

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Philosophical Dream.see Paul Lodge: "Leibniz's Philosophical Dream of Rational Enlightenment", in: *Dialogue and Universalism* 32 (2022), pp. 203-19.

[10] Two of the most obvious examples are the character of Theophilus in the *New Essays on Human Understanding* (A VI, 6) and the character of Philarète in the "Conversation of Philarète and Ariste" (GP VI, 579-94).

[11] See A VI 4, 1658.

presented as making any kind of judgment about the truth of Pallas' account whilst he is having the dream. This happens only after he wakes.

My suggestion in light of all this is that the Petite Fable is intended to provide the reader with an account of why Leibniz himself accepts the best of all possible worlds thesis. And, in virtue of this, gives them a reason to accept it as well. The most literal version would run as follows: Leibniz is attaching an account - perhaps somewhat embellished - of one of his own dreams to the Valla dialogue.[12] This was a dream in which he was told by God that the best of all possible worlds was the actual world. Moreover, it was a world in which became "rapt in ecstasy" (Th 3 §416); a world in which his experience of existing could be said to have been unsurpassably good. So not only was Leibniz told that he was in the best of all possible worlds, it seemed to him that he was as well.

This is then followed by an account of how Leibniz reacted on waking from this dream. He thanked God and, more importantly, recognized that the dream was a dream in which the justice of God was saved, since it contained an experience of the actual world as the best possible world. It was a dream in which God could be legitimately regarded as just not merely as a matter of fact, but as matter of experienced fact. And recognizing this, Leibniz appropriated and taught the content of the dream – the very same content proved in Th 1 §7-§8 - and found that his life was a joyful as possible for a mortal. In other words, the ecstatic experience of the dream was replicated in real life to the extent that he lived out his life "pervaded by what he ha[d] seen and heard" (Th §417/H 373).

The justification that was ultimately lacking in connection with Th 1 §7-§8 proof was provided. The best of all possible worlds thesis and its attendant cosmogony gain their initial foothold insofar as Leibniz has them revealed to him in his dream. But their ultimate justification is that taking the revelation to be genuine enabled Leibniz to no longer be troubled by the problem of evil and live out a joyful existence.[13]

To complete the interpretation, we need to return to the reader of the *Theodicy*, the person for whom the Petite Fable is supposed to present a better account than the argument of Th 1 §7-§8. Here the thought is that Leibniz is offering himself as a preacher of a gospel of a particular kind. He attests to the fact that a supremely joyful mode of being is available, and suggests that a life pervaded by the cosmogony that is present both in the Fable and in the argu-

[12] One could also imagine a version in which Leibniz was taken to be clothing his sense of having had another form of personal religious experience in this guise.

[13] Leibniz seems to have taken himself to have such an existence from much earlier on in his life. Thus, in "On the Secrets of the Sublime, or on the Supreme Being", which he wrote on 11 February 1676, Leibniz observes "I know no one happier than I am, as a result of which I envy no king … I am certain that God takes special care of me… in that he has opened to me such a certain and easy way of happiness" (A VI 3, 477).

ment is one that has sustained this life for him. It is the existence of this justification of the content that is made available.

If anything like this interpretation is plausible, then it obviously leaves further questions. First there is an interpretative question, insofar as one might wonder whether this explanation deserves to be called "easy and familiar" (GP VI, 48), or could be said to explain things "in the clearest and the most straightforward [*populaire*] way possible" (Th 3 §405). There is more that needs to be said here and a detailed account would require a fuller investigation into the way in which Leibniz and his readers would have regarded the employment of myth and dreams as literary devices. I don't as yet have a way to discharge the "ease and familiarity" claim, other than with the thought that narratives of this kind are more readily digested than formal arguments. However, one relevant consideration when it comes to the issue of "clarity and straightforwardness" may be that the interpretation presents Leibniz as laying claim to a personal revelation. Elsewhere, Leibniz himself had suggested that those making such claims should be treated with great suspicion.[14] And it is possible that he considered the expression of personal revelation to be something that should be kept somewhat cryptic, i.e., as clear as possible given the kind of risk involved in making such a claim, but not clear simpliciter.

There is also the question of what dialectical role presenting this kind of justification could have played. As Leibniz himself had implied in his criticisms of enthusiasts and false mystics, why should anyone else care about, let alone trust in Leibniz's claims about the relation between the best of all possible worlds cosmogony and joyful existence? The response to this is surely no different than could be offered by anyone who takes themselves to have an experiential ground, namely that, in the end, the answer can only really be obtained insofar as the one asking is willing to trust the in the possibility that the testimony is reliable and open themselves to having the experience themselves.

One might also wonder whether one should be concerned that such an interpretation seems to leave Leibniz with nothing more than a pragmatic justification for accepting the world view of the Fable, based on its having given him a sense of having "all the joy of which a mortal is capable" (Th 3 §417). The obvious response here, insofar as one recognizes the lack of epistemic justification for the principles on which the Th 1 §7-§8 argument is based, is to ask what other kind of justification there could ultimately be.[15]

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[14] See Paul Lodge: "True and False Mysticism in Leibniz", in: *The Leibniz Review* 25 (2015), pp. 62-71.

[15] It is worth noting at this point that I have argued elsewhere that Leibniz's justification for the Principle of Sufficient Reason is perhaps also best regarded as ultimately pragmatic. See Paul Lodge: "Leibniz's Justification for the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Mainly) in the Correspondence with Clarke", in: *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* 21 (2018), pp. 69-91.

Finally, one might wonder why Leibniz bothered providing the earlier proof at all if he didn't regard it as an articulation of his own justification for believing what it proved. One possibility here is as follows: Insofar as I've presented Leibniz's ultimate justification as pragmatic, might it be that he would have been content to draw his reader to the point of living a life pervaded by acceptance the best of all possible worlds thesis by any means available. So, for those who like proof, he offers the best proof that he can muster hoping that at least some of those people will be convinced. And in the case of those who are not, he hopes that his own testimony will persuade instead.

However, we also need to pay attention to the dialectical context in which the proof appears. One of Leibniz's main concerns in the *Theodicy* is the way in which Bayle insists that the existence of the traditional Christian God has to be upheld despite the deliverances of reason. According to Leibniz, Bayle is committed to the claim that reason dictates that the correct way to respond to the existence of evil is to accept the "lapsed dogma of the two principles, or two gods, the one good, the other evil" (GP VI, 34); but that at the same time that monotheism "is incontestably founded on *a priori* reasons" (ibid.). Furthermore, Leibniz suggest that Bayle's response to this is impasse is to "infer that our Reason gets confused and cannot satisfy the objections", and then ignore the deliverances of reason and "hold firm to revealed dogmas" (ibid.).

Whilst Leibniz does not depict Bayle as anything other than a committed theist, he expresses concern that others may "draw harmful conclusions" (ibid.) insofar as they take Bayle's reasoning to be sound. Setting aside the worries raised above about whether one should be committed to the principles of reason as Leibniz conceives of them in the first place, this allows us to see why Leibniz might have presented a proof, or reasoned argument, for the best of all possible worlds thesis. For the conclusion of this argument serves as a rebuttal to Bayle's suggestion that reliance on reason leaves the problem of evil insoluble and demands the postulation of an evil principle.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have attempted to provide an explanation for why Leibniz included the Petite Fable in the *Theodicy* despite there being *prima facie* reasons for thinking that it is redundant. There is much more to be explored in connection with the provisional explanation that I have offered. However, I hope that focussing attention on these issues may stimulate reflection on the Petite Fable itself. And, in addition, that it may stimulate more discussion about the ways in which Leibniz employs forms of writing other than direct argument in the *Theodicy* and elsewhere.[16]

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[16] Many thanks to Åsne Grøgaard and Henry Straughan for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft. This paper is dedicated to the memory Maria Rosa Antognazza, in

gratitude for her friendship and for the many conversations which helped shape my thinking about Leibniz.